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I. Towards an Ethics of Inquiry and Public Discourse 
This paper builds on a developing movement to determine what, if any, ethical constraints ought to be exercised in the process of intellectual inquiry; and what, if any, ethical burdens fall upon professional researchers regarding the public explication of scientific matters. In particular this article will focus on how an ethics of inquiry connects to, and ought to inform, an ethics of public discourse among researchers and laypersons alike, particularly when scientific findings are relevant to public policy. One framing issue, which has been discussed by Philip Kitcher, is whether or not there are paths of scientific investigation so potentially harmful that pursuing them is morally irresponsible.
Kitcher advances the view that in the context of particular cultural milieus, certain scientific investigations are not worth the social harms they might engender.​[1]​ Kitcher argues, for example, that racial prejudices are held in place by what he deems “political and epistemological asymmetries.” Political asymmetries are the consequences of ideological prejudices specific to one’s cultural history. For instance, the United States’ long history of institutional racism and its accompanying tensions remain influential despite the official political condemnation of all institutional and public discrimination.​[2]​ Epistemological asymmetries result from the widespread tendency people have to inflate inaccurately the level of evidential support available for their personal beliefs. ​[3]​ 
Such asymmetries cause individuals with a particular prejudice to magnify findings favorable to their own views while ignoring any findings that challenge their positions. Given the asymmetrical effect of prejudiced thinking on race and intelligence, and thus the likelihood that any research into the topic will be misrepresented (regardless of outcome) by bigoted groups promoting racist social agendas, Kitcher argues that such research ought not to be pursued.​[4]​ 
A related but alternative position argues against any duties to refrain from particular lines of investigation, and instead emphasizes communicative responsibilities. Scott F. Aikin and Michael D. Harbour argue that researchers have the burden of communicating the implications of their work with a mindful regard for political and epistemological asymmetries, and that researchers have the additional responsibility of engaging publically with those who misrepresent scientific findings in order to advance a personal agenda.​[5]​ Aikin and Harbour use evolution as an example of a subject particularly prone to the distortions of political and epistemic asymmetry. Such asymmetries prompt a fundamental responsibility for researchers who deal with the topic to communicate scientific findings to the public clearly, and to assertively address any public misrepresentations of evolutionary research that may occur in the wider culture.​[6]​
The present article supports the latter position unequivocally, yet posits additionally (in section II) that an ethics of inquiry extends to the public at large (scientific experts and laypersons alike) insofar as citizens are publically engaged in political advocacy that relates or responds to scientific matters. I therefore maintain that any political advocacy concerning scientific inquiry implies, and ought to be interpreted as implying, a circumspect due diligence in preparation for public discourse. Furthermore, I maintain that such an extension places a special communicative obligation (similar to that advocated by Aikin and Harbour for scientific researchers) upon all professional academics, politicians, journalists, or anyone who may play a prominent role in framing and informing public discourse. Such citizens ought to place special emphasis upon the appropriate scrutiny of evidence, upon rational circumspection, and upon their own professional limitations in asserting public arguments. This obligation comes from the responsibility such professionals incur as educators and, on occasion, as public intellectuals with their own boundaries of professional expertise. In the context of the cognitive symmetries previously mentioned, an ethics of public political discourse relating to science and public affairs is necessary to temper speech that is laced with sensational misrepresentations, distortions, and simplistic (if intuitive) misunderstandings. In other words, the ethics of public discourse and inquiry requires that we attend to the rhetorical asymmetries that one can reasonably expect to follow from cognitive asymmetries.​[7]​ 
I will make my argument, in part, by considering the works of W.K. Clifford and John Rawls, and by proposing a revision and a reconfiguration of these works respectively. While endorsing the line of argument that leads Clifford to make strong moral claims about belief, my aim is to shift focus from unwarranted belief to specific cases of unwarranted public/political assertions against scientific consensus. As such, I will frame the need for an extended application of Rawlsian public reason beyond its traditional realms of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.​[8]​ More specifically, the idea of public reason will be extended as a necessary counter-measure meant to minimize the moral hazards resulting from confused public discourse and political advocacy, which stem from (and exacerbate) the cognitive asymmetries referenced above.​[9]​ Such asymmetries commonly lead to morally relevant misunderstandings of science among policy makers and the general public, which in turn inordinately affects vulnerable populations worldwide.​[10]​ 
The application of public reason can and should be advanced beyond constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice to address the complexity of situations in which it is difficult for non-specialists to accurately discuss (or fully comprehend) the reasoning behind scientific conclusions, conclusions which nevertheless have crucial relevance to public political discourse. Moreover, the political incentives to publically dismiss some strong scientific conclusions, or even to cynically challenge them, need to be countered straightforwardly and procedurally to better avoid the dangers of public misinformation regarding science.​[11]​  It is therefore worth reflecting upon the relationship between private comprehensive doctrines and cognitive asymmetries, and the means by which the former (independently of overtly stated arguments) often, if not always, influences the latter to corrupt public discourse regarding science. 
I want to emphasize how the demands of public reason can be brought to connect a responsible ethics of inquiry to public discourse on issues of science. To be clear, the position offered will be Rawlsian in spirit, but it is not a position explicitly endorsed by Rawls. Finally, while there are many excellent examples of, or forums for, exploring the ethics of inquiry and discourse pursued here (the discussion of evolutionary theory being but one), I maintain that no contemporary issue currently demonstrates what is at stake better than climate change. As such, I will illustrate my arguments using the primary example of public discourse, as opposed to scientific discourse, concerning global warming. 
So what does an ethics of inquiry entail for the interested non-expert?
II. Belief, Consensus, and Assertion
W. K. Clifford’s essay “The Ethics of Belief” (1879), famously states that “it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”​[12]​ Clifford is not simply acknowledging the obvious point that such forms of belief are epistemologically dubious, but the far more contentious point that such forms of belief are morally negligent. In order to illustrate his position, Clifford cites the example of a ship owner who contracts his vessel to carry emigrants to the new world.​[13]​ The ship owner is aware of different reasons why his ship might not be seaworthy, including its age, exposure to previous storms, and its sub-par construction. However, before allowing the ship to sail he manages to quell his doubts, not by overhauling the vessel for inspection and repair but by rationalizing away his misgivings, and thereby yielding to a blind trust in providence. After his brief bout with uncertainty is resolved Clifford tells the reader that the ship owner saw his ship’s “…departure with a light heart, […] and he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.”​[14]​ 
Clifford argues that the tragic ending of this example is morally irrelevant. In the case presented, the ship owner has no satisfactory reason to trust the material soundness of his ship, and this—regardless of outcome—is of primary moral significance. Nevertheless, the concerned reader might argue that it is not the ship owner’s false belief, but his lack of sufficient maintenance, i.e. his actions, or in this case his failure to act, which result in tragedy. Yet, as Clifford counters, it is not possible to consider a belief innocent while condemning the actions that stem from that belief. It is tenuous to assume that one can sincerely hold a belief and not be moved to action by that belief eventually. In any case, such hope could serve no purpose but to elevate torpidity to a moral virtue. Furthermore, once a belief has taken root it becomes difficult to assess opposing points of view fairly; which is a necessary guard against rash and unwarranted belief and actions. Thus we have a moral responsibility to tend judiciously to the origins of our beliefs. 
Such arguments about the ethics of belief hinge on two related points: (1) No matter how innocuous a belief may seem, it will set the condition for similar and related beliefs. If a particular belief is not directly responsible for a certain action then it is indirectly responsible insofar as it shaped the epistemological framework for that belief which is responsible.​[15]​ (2) Since the nature of human life is largely communal, belief is never so private a thing as it might first seem: human beings inevitably influence one another. Furthermore, even if we were able to isolate our actions from our beliefs, there would be no guarantee that others under our influence could avoid (be it intended or not) taking actions that by our influence resulted in identifiable and otherwise avoidable harms. There is good reason to assent to these points. 
Regarding the first claim, it is reasonable for Clifford to insist that our beliefs set the condition for similar beliefs to follow upon them. If we are careless in one domain of cognitive experience, we are likely to be careless in others. Accepted inferences of one logical form, valid or not, help define a standard for other such inferences. It is plausible to assume that a person who agrees that unexplainable noises in an old house are haunting spirits, simply because such an explanation cannot be disproven, will be more likely to accept claims, again simply because such a claim cannot be disproven, that unexplainable lights in the night sky are extraterrestrial space-craft. 
Likewise, one is more apt to assent to unsupported claims that unknown buildings in desert satellite images are weapons of mass destruction facilities if one is also inclined to concede that unexplained (as opposed to unexplainable) evolutionary processes are “irreducibly complex,” and therefore evidence of intelligent design.​[16]​ All such invalid conclusions, regardless of their different subject matters, are predicated on the fallacious but familiar logical form: (P) cannot be disproven, therefore (P) is true. In other words, this is the belief that lack of evidence against a claim must count in the claim’s favor—it is otherwise known as an appeal to ignorance. 
The claim being made (that fallacious forms of reasoning consistently engender fallacious judgments) does not depend on anecdotal examples, but in the recognition that our judgments, and derivative beliefs, are often made in the context of identifiable cognitive patterns. That the mind has a tendency to fall into consistent patterns of fallacious inference is a non-controversial (foundational) justification for the importance of logical analysis and critical thinking. When interpreted in this light, Clifford’s claim that unwarranted belief sets the condition for more unwarranted belief is highly plausible. ​[17]​
As for the second of Clifford’s points, it is likewise easily admitted that holding a belief without warrant involves some moral hazard in the sense that one’s unwarranted belief may have consequences (foreseen or not) that adversely affect innocent parties.​[18]​ If one fails to be appropriately cautious in the face of uncertainty, such moral hazard may transform into moral tragedy. To take Clifford’s example of the ship owner, the belief itself that one’s ship is seaworthy merely entails a moral hazard. Had the ship owner had his ship inspected and fortified before allowing passengers to embark on a transatlantic voyage, the tragedy, and his moral culpability for the tragedy, might have been avoided. Likewise, a reasonable commitment to responsible intellectual circumspection is vital for any person with responsibilities involving others, including all voting citizens. On these grounds, it is worth insisting that a responsible ethics of inquiry ought to extend to the public at large to the extent that citizens throw their lot together as public participants, subject to the moral hazards of communal life. 
Acknowledging the moral hazard posed by unwarranted beliefs, and thus the ethical responsibility to foster appropriate standards of belief, does not, however, justify a categorical moral condemnation of every unwarranted belief. It remains difficult to go along fully with Clifford’s statement “it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”​[19]​ Clarification is needed, as well as guidance concerning practical application for an ethics of public discourse.  
Without a clear sense of what constitutes warranted belief, and clarification regarding the type of belief being discussed, Clifford’s bold condemnation of unwarranted belief under all circumstances is insufficiently helpful.​[20]​ By way of building on Clifford, and of increasing the relevance of his thought for democratic societies marked by the free exchange of ideas, it is important to recognize, more explicitly than Clifford, the meaningful distinction between fact and value.​[21]​ There are beliefs that are not truth-apt, and may be accepted or rejected without any ethical implications. For instance, if a person believes that Vincent Van Gogh is the greatest of all post-impressionist painters, and furthermore that The Potato Eaters (1885) is his superlative work, what can be said about such beliefs ethically? Very little—and likewise for the person who believes that Johann Sebastian Bach is the greatest composer ever to live, or that the finest expressions of Riesling in the New World are to be found in the dry wines of New York’s Finger Lakes region. These are matters of value, not fact, but they are used here to demonstrate the need for such a distinction if Clifford’s ethics of belief is to remain relevant for a modern ethics of inquiry. Indeed, it would seem that Clifford’s own categorical condemnation of unwarranted belief is well beyond what can be warranted, since it is unclear how such a claim, even if true, can ever be verified.​[22]​  
There is no doubt good reason to affirm, as Clifford does, that all individuals rightly bear a moral responsibility to approach inquiry and belief with lucidity and due diligence.​[23]​ It is more difficult to conclude from this, as Clifford does, that unwarranted belief is worthy of categorical moral condemnation in and of itself. Irresponsibly holding an unwarranted belief is morally hazardous to be sure, and ought to be guarded against and discouraged. I argue, with Clifford, that an ethics of inquiry ought to commend the development of appropriate habits of credulity in all citizens to the extent that civic engagement requires a minimal level of inquiry sufficient to be an informed voter. The failure to live up to the appropriate standards of inquiry required to be a responsible citizen is a serious problem, but it is when failure to cultivate appropriate habits of credulity prompts the insertion of unwarranted claims into specific conditions of public discourse that something morally egregious, and worthy of strong public condemnation, has occurred. When should an ethics of inquiry reasonably trigger strong moral condemnation of unwarranted assertions?
  There are subjects (e.g. climate change) of settled scientific consensus with clear social and global implications.​[24]​ If one does not fully understand the facts of scientific consensus on such topics, then those facts may be studied. It should not be objected that such study requires technical education beyond the practical reach of most, for there are professional researchers and teachers with relevant expertise, willingness, and the pedagogical ability to make consensus in science—and the reasons for consensus—understandable to the lay person.​[25]​ The moral importance of getting facts right on matters with extreme social and global ramifications (such as climate change) cannot be overstated. Thus, for a non-expert to insist doggedly on a contrarian view regarding such topics is evidentially and morally irresponsible. In cases like these, the obstinate public promotion of beliefs contrary to established scientific consensus by non-experts, and especially in the context of political advocacy, is morally condemnable. 
Such cases display a morally reckless and unjustified level of anti-intellectual (or at times pseudo-intellectual) cynicism, which identifiably harms society. This is so because the growing public ignorance on climate change results in diminished collective action. Indeed, in our example of climate change, this relative complicity has been the case for three decades.​[26]​ The changes necessary to begin cutting down our combined carbon emissions to acceptable levels will require nothing short of a paradigm shift in the collective thinking of the industrialized world. The crucial reality is that fossil fuel based technologies will remain prominent (barring depletion of resources) until market demands instigate an uncompromising insistence on more sustainable technologies. No such demands will be made by significantly uninformed consumers.​[27]​ 
With regard to the moral implications of such denialism, the example of climate change is not unique. One might, for example, also cite AIDS denial and anti-vaccination movements.​[28]​ Such denialism is often described, and promoted, as “skeptical,” but skepticism is a misnomer in these cases since it suggests thoughtful circumspection and inquiry.  Such anti-scientific views are better described as pseudoskeptical.​[29]​ Pseudoskepticism, as I am using the term, is a seemingly “skeptical” artifice involving the rejection, by non-experts, of claims that are already scientifically accepted. Pseudoskepticism is based on the fallacious assumption that doubt qua doubt is inherently rational. This is not the case if good reason already exists to support the truth of a claim.​[30]​ 
What sort of guidance, for public discourse, should those concerned with an ethics of inquiry draw from the identification of morally negligent pseudoskeptical assertions? 
III. Science and Public Discourse

In Political Liberalism (1993) John Rawls develops the concept of public reason, which designates a comprehensively neutral approach to public discourse that brackets away arguments based on private comprehensive notions of morality. The premise behind public reason is that contentious issues of public concern regarding constitutional essentials or questions of basic justice ought not to be legislated from comprehensive doctrines, since such doctrines are not necessarily compelling (or even understandable) to every reasonable person.​[31]​ Therefore, when attempting to influence public legislation on such matters, one is required to present arguments that all reasonable people can recognize and understand, even if they disagree. For example, attempting to influence legislation on end of life issues by appealing exclusively to Christian arguments is inconsistent with standards of public reason. Likewise, any attempt to influence such legislation based on any comprehensive tradition, whether religious or secular, is inconsistent with public reason. 
The religious or otherwise metaphysical nature of comprehensive doctrines makes them controversial, inapplicable to all, and thus unhelpful in determining reasonable and stable solutions in a morally pluralistic society.​[32]​ To be sure, to the degree that societies are free and open they are bound to be morally pluralistic. Nevertheless, even when one sticks to the traditional requirements of public reason, it is possible that one’s comprehensive doctrines may enter into public debates indirectly. This is to say—and this point is consistent with Clifford—that comprehensive doctrines and their attending beliefs and values are deep sources of bias, which can often, if not in every circumstance, affect the way we interpret data in the public sphere.​[33]​ The cognitive asymmetries emphasized by Kitcher, Aikin, and Harbour may often stem from the natural influence comprehensive doctrines (reasonable and unreasonable) have on one’s personal biases. 
The responsible practice of scientific investigation (when done according to the accepted standards of the larger scientific community) is geared toward eliminating those cognitive asymmetries that may result from confirmation bias, whereas the denial of scientific consensus by non-experts is not tempered by any procedural process to mitigate such influences. I am therefore suggesting that denialism with regard to scientific consensus, or what I have called pseudoskepticism, often stems from cognitive asymmetries plausibly influenced by comprehensive doctrines.​[34]​ 
It may be the case that legitimate scientists sometimes disagree with a scientific consensus, but to the extent that they are actively working to scientifically investigate their hypotheses, they cannot be dubbed pseudoskeptics. Nevertheless, when weighing in on public debates, such scientific dissenters ought to state in unambiguous terms what the scientific consensus actually is regarding the given topic.  However, more often than not, the news media fails to allow professional researchers sufficient opportunity to play an adequate role in the public debate, or to explain matters of ongoing inquiry without sensationalizing disagreement. Furthermore, professional researchers themselves are often hesitant to engage the media in a manner adequate to making their findings broadly understandable; in these cases, researchers are also somewhat responsible for the exaggeration of cognitive asymmetries.​[35]​
Consequently, “debates” in the media are too often held on scientific topics without an explanation of the scientific consensus, but are rather staged by pitting against each other two diverging non-experts.​[36]​ More often than not “debaters” are drawn from different sides of the political spectrum, and one can safely predict that their conclusions will align with their corporate and political affiliations. It is important to counter the corrupting influence of cognitive asymmetries by limiting public arguments to facts that have been established and endorsed through scientific consensus, when such facts are available. Otherwise, as Bertrand Russell has argued, when the experts are not in agreement, or when they confirm that no sufficient evidence exists for an informed opinion, the non-expert ought to remain agnostic.​[37]​ Because it is the case that our metaphysically laden value systems can so easily corrupt our interpretations of scientific data, it is important that we take care to limit our public arguments to those consistent with scientific consensus when arguing in the public sphere.​[38]​ 
Consequently, in an ideally fair and just society informed by an adequate ethics of inquiry (inclusive to researchers and laypersons alike), where metaphysically neutral arguments are put forward transparently for public consideration, public reason must stick to established scientific consensus when matters of scientific relevance are pertinent to constitutional essentials and basic justice. Just as metaphysically laden moral doctrines are controversial, unhelpful, and even dangerous in public decision making, so too, unaccepted scientific hypotheses, because they are controversial or unaccepted by the community of relevant scientific experts, are harmful to informed public discourse and public policy. 
These arguments are supported by Rawls’ own guidelines for public inquiry, which are meant to clarify standards for public reason. As Rawls puts it:
….on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice, the basic structure and its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens, as the principle of political legitimacy requires. We add to this that in making these justifications we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial. The liberal principle of legitimacy makes this most appropriate, if not the only, way to specify the guidelines of public inquiry. [italics mine]​[39]​ 

As stated, Rawls limits his discussion of the guidelines of inquiry to issues of constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice, but he does not rule out the possibility that other political issues ought to be the concern of public reason as well. 
Some will ask: why not say that all questions in regard to which citizens exercise their final and coercive political power over one another are subject to public reason? Why would it ever be admissible to go outside its range of political values? To answer: my aim is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions concern the most fundamental matters. If we should not honor the limits of public reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere. Should they hold here, we can then proceed to other cases. Still, I grant that it is usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public reason. Yet this may not always be so.​[40]​

I maintain that Rawls is correct in insisting that fundamental matters of constitution and justice require discourse guided by the limits of public reason. Furthermore I contend that such limits must be extended into domains not initially insisted upon by Rawls. In particular, the need for an ethics of public discourse informed by, and akin to, an ethics of inquiry provides the proper incentive for an extension of public reason to all matters of public discourse relevant to science and to public policy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any topic of public political concern that ought to be settled by appeal to private doctrines in any circumstance. Should one be discovered, it would be better to treat it as an exception to be dealt with discretely rather than a defining example. 
The ubiquitous effects of cognitive symmetries, the moral hazards surrounding unwarranted belief, and the good reasons we have to stick with expert opinion on scientific matters mandate my claim that public reason ought to be extended to all political discourse regarding science and public policy. This proposed extension of public reason on all matters of science and public policy stands as a necessary corrective to rhetorical asymmetries corrosive to productive public discourse. It does so precisely because such an extension demands that arguments inconsistent with scientific consensus be avoided in public debates relevant to public policy decisions. To limit such arguments to scientifically uncontroversial points decreases the political promotion of misinformation that compounds the problems associated with cognitive asymmetries.  
Consequently, policy makers, academics, journalists, and anyone else sought for public remark on contentious issues ought to adopt this version of public reason explicitly when commenting in the public realm. When they do not, those in the just-named groups ought to publically censure the inappropriate remarks. The need to take on this responsibility, as has been suggested, is nowhere better illustrated than in current public debates regarding the science of climate change and its implications for public policy.  Furthermore, failure to sustain public reason on issues of science and public policy represents a specific case where the public advocacy of beliefs contrary to scientific consensus is not just morally irresponsible, but morally condemnable.  
IV. Some Possible Objections
	There are four objections that might be made to my strict insistence that public reason (with its reliance on scientific consensus) be extended to all civic discourse regarding science and public policy. (1) To depend so heavily on scientific consensus amounts to a blatant appeal to authority. (2) To dismiss arguments contrary to the established scientific consensus, when such consensus exists, amounts to the endorsement of censorship against minority opinions in science. (3) Eliminating comprehensive doctrines from public discourse is unfairly restrictive to some citizens and therefore suppresses robust debate. (4.) Science itself, as an epistemic method engaged in by subjective agents, is inherently subject to investigator biases, and therefore is no better or worse than other forms of inquiry. 
First, regarding fallacious appeals to authority: it ought to be remembered that not every appeal to authority is fallacious. It stands to reason that when true expertise exists on a topic, it is not fallacious to appeal to that expertise. Appeals to expert authority are necessary and responsible when one personally lacks the needed expertise. It follows that such appeals are strengthened when they can be made to a majority expert consensus. Of course this does not guarantee that experts are always right, but it is never reasonable to disregard expert opinion in favor of non-expert opinion. This holds true from auto repair to medicine, and of course for climate science. 
As for the second likely objection: I have not proposed that making pseudoskeptical claims in public policy debates ought to carry an official penalty, any more than straightforwardly arguing from comprehensive religious doctrines ought to carry an official penalty. To enforce such prohibitions would indeed amount to censorship. What I have proposed, consistent with Rawls’ own understanding of public reason, is to extend jurisdiction of public reason beyond constitutional essentials and basic justice to all public discourse and political advocacy regarding science and public policy. Recognizing the need for informed and neutral public discourse, especially regarding scientific matters and legislation about them, is not meaningfully different from recognizing the need to exclude religious and otherwise controversial metaphysical views from influencing legislation on questions of constitutional essentials and basic justice. Rather, such insistence endorses and supports responsible and intellectually circumspect public discourse regarding science and public affairs. Furthermore, I have argued that making pseudoskeptical claims in public policy discussions is morally condemnable. However, even this is not a call for censorship of free speech. It remains the case that one should have the freedom to say many things that nevertheless ought to be morally condemned. 
The third objection is closely related to the second, but aimed straightforwardly at Rawls’ conception of public reason in and of itself. The argument is that public reason as a concept is too restrictive, and unfairly disallows seriously held comprehensive doctrines from entering the public discourse generally. While I agree with Rawls’ insistence on public reason and find such counterarguments unconvincing, it is worth noting that Rawls does, as a proviso, allow for the inclusion of comprehensive doctrines in relevant public debates provided they are consistent with or accompanied by public reasons. There is indeed good reason to stick with the limits of public reason in a pluralistic society, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to mount a general defense of Rawls’ public reason. It is enough to note that the issue itself is separate. Even if one were to cede this point, it remains possible to allow comprehensive doctrines to play a role in public discourse generally, while nevertheless maintaining that with regard to science and public policy one still ought to limit one’s arguments to those consistent with current scientific consensus for the reasons already stated above.
Finally, regarding the claim that scientific consensus is not neutral, but is itself influenced by personal bias and public opinion: it must be admitted that no epistemological method is necessarily free from human bias. Nevertheless, proper scientific process mitigates such burdens of judgment, perhaps better than any other tool of inquiry at our disposal. Indeed, the success of science is tangible in its broad application and in technological advancements from healthcare to space travel. To deny the obvious success of science as a tool for inquiry, precisely because it strives to mitigate human prejudice, is naïve at best; at worst it represents the height of pedantic sensationalism.​[41]​     
V. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations
We live in a society that too often manufactures scientific controversy where none exists. Scientific questions do not belong in the category of things that can be settled by general public debate. Nevertheless, our private comprehensive doctrines can influence the way we interpret scientific data, thus compounding the problems associated with cognitive asymmetries, with implications for public debate and subsequent public policy decisions. In matters such as global warming, cognitive asymmetries (informed by private comprehensive doctrines), when mixed into the public sphere, can have far reaching consequences on the health and well-being of their possessors and of others. 
Because our patterns of cognitive analysis set up the conditions for similar beliefs to follow, and because we are not isolated citizens but are bound to influence one another directly and indirectly, unwarranted beliefs create a condition of moral hazard that ought to be taken seriously. Many academics, professional journalists, and most politicians are well placed, and often well equipped to detect and counter pseudoskeptical assertions in advance of the general public. Indeed, journalists are ideally positioned to counter pseudoskeptical claims by providing greater coverage of legitimate scientific consensus. As a consequence of the greater public responsibility such professionals have, it is a graver ethical breach when these figures indulge in pseudoskeptical assertions regarding science and public discourse.
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